Iran’s decision to reject the US ceasefire proposal and decline to enter negotiations was not simply a hardline bargaining stance — it reflected a considered judgment that formal talks with Washington were dangerous. The country had twice been attacked by US or Israeli forces while diplomatic processes were underway. These experiences had created a powerful institutional memory that shaped Iranian decision-making and made officials deeply resistant to any engagement that could leave them exposed.
The first of these experiences was the 12-day war last summer, during which US forces attacked Iran’s nuclear facilities even while diplomatic discussions were in progress. The second was even more direct: the current conflict was reportedly initiated while progress toward a comprehensive deal between the two parties was being made. For Iranian officials, these were not coincidences but evidence of a deliberate American pattern of using negotiations as intelligence-gathering exercises or as delays before military strikes.
The targeted killing of Ali Larijani and other senior Iranian officials reinforced this interpretation. Larijani had been one of the more pragmatic voices in Iran’s security establishment, the kind of figure who could have served as a genuine interlocutor with Western negotiators. His elimination, and Israel’s explicit threats to target others involved in negotiations, sent a clear message to anyone considering engagement: talking to the enemy could get you killed.
In this context, Iran’s formal rejection of the US proposal and its counter-proposal setting out its own conditions served a dual purpose. They maintained Iran’s public posture of defiance while keeping the diplomatic option theoretically open. By submitting its own five-point plan, Tehran was not closing the door on negotiations entirely but insisting that talks, if they happened, would be on Iranian terms and would include genuine security guarantees.
The challenge for any future diplomacy was therefore not primarily about the substance of the issues — nuclear programmes, missiles, the Strait of Hormuz — but about creating a framework in which Iranian officials could engage without risking their lives. Until that problem was solved, the history of being attacked during negotiations would continue to cast its shadow over every diplomatic exchange, making genuine progress extraordinarily difficult to achieve regardless of how many intermediaries were involved.